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marital
* • ifinji t e d

•

one-half?

Appellant has the burden of marshaling all the

evidence supporting the finding and of demonstrating that, even
if viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court, the
evidence is legally insufficient to support the findings.

Doelle

v. Bradley. 784 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Utah 1989); Jensen v. Brown. 639
P.2d 150, 152 (Utah 1981).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 75-6-103.
lifetime.--(1)

Ownership during

A joint account belongs, during the lifetime of

all parties, to the parties in proportion to the net
contributions by each to the sums on deposit, unless there is
clear and convincing evidence of a different intent.
Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-202(2)(b).

All values included

in the augmented estate are presumed to be marital property.

The

presumption of marital property is overcome by a showing that the
property to which these values is not marital property as defined
in subsection (2)(a) of this section.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

flgityre

of the C??e*

This is an appeal from an Order of the lower court (R.
187) and from Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 181),
by which the court held that appellee Louise A. Maxfield owned
one-half of the sums that had been on deposit in joint accounts
at the time she withdrew the sums therefrom.
i
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B.

The action was commenced following the death of John
Ben Maxfield by the filing of an Application for Informal Probate
of Will and Informal Appointment of Personal Representative (R.
1) to which appellee objected (R. 6). Thereafter, appellee filed
a Motion to File Amended Pleading and to Bifurcate the Issues to
be Heard at the Time of Trial (R. 36), which was granted (R. 47).
Appellee filed an Amended Objection to Application for Informal
Probate and Petition for Determination if there are Assets
Comprising an Estate and Petition for Formal Probate and
Appointment of Personal Representative.

(R. 38. )

Trial was held on June 11, 1990, following which the
trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law from the
bench.

(Tr. 233-38, 293-97.)

The Court entered its written

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on October 11, 1990, (R.
181,

186) from which appellant appealed.

Although appellee filed

a cross-appeal, she has determined not to pursue the crossappeal, as explained below.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant John Ben Maxfield ("Ben") and Louise A.
Maxfield ("Louise") were married in September of 1961.
Each was approximately fifty years old at the time.

(Tr. 9. )

Ben had two

children from a prior marriage, Ben J. Maxfield and Joy Thornock.

-3g:\wpl\088\00000wrp.W51
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Louise had three children from a prior marriage, Alice Coffman,
Karen Wall, and Stanton LeSieur.
At the time of the marriage, Louise owned a home
located at 474 16th Street in Ogden, Utah and approximately
$1, 200 in a checking account,,

(Tr. 9, 235-36. ) Louise' s home

served as the marital domicile until November of 1986 (Tr. 102)
when Ben' s health required that he be placed in a rest home
setting.

(Tr. 89-91. )
At the time of his marriage to Louise in 1961, Ben

owned a farm in Harrisville, Utah, a small tract of residential
property in Harrisville, and stock in the Hisfield Gravel
Company.
$500.

He also had a checking account containing approximately

(Tr. 9. ) Ben also had rights to a contract worth

approximately $8,000 from the sale of property located at 368
Collins, (Lot 1, Block 1, El Rancho) Ogden, Utah to George H. and
Donna G. Eastman.

(Ex. lip and 23d. ) Because Ben owed

approximately the same amount c>n the property to Ray Westly and
Joyce Elaine Moss (Ex. 23d), however, the Eastman Contract
i

apparently was worthless.
Through their 28 year marriage, the monies, affairs,
business, and lives of Louise and Ben were extensively
{

intermingled and they jointly participated in the mutual support
and care for one another.
March) until 1971.

Louise worked at C. C. Anderson (Bon

(Tr. 16, 22. ) All the money that she earned
i
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went into joint accounts with Ben.

(Tr. 16. )

Similarly,

appellants admit that Ben also pooled his earnings with Louise in
the joint checking and joint savings accounts and the joint
certificates of deposit.

(Appellants' brief, at 4. )

Ben and

Louise also participated in numerous transactions whereby they
purchased, improved, or sold real estate.

The proceeds from all

these sales were placed in their joint accounts.

(Tr. 15).

In

later years, rather than deposit her Social Security check in the
joint accounts, Louise simply would cash it to buy groceries.
(Tr.

71, 128. )

The couple filed joint income tax returns every

year since 1961.

(Tr. 15. )

The Maxfield's real estate transactions can be divided
into three groups:
(1)

Sales of the Harrisville residential property

that had been brought into the marriage by Ben and
improved during the marriage by Ben and Louise.
(2)

Sales of real property conveyed to both

Louise and Ben during the marriage from His field Gravel
Company.
(3)

The resale of miscellaneous parcels of real

estate that had been jointly acquired during the
marriage.

-5g:\wpl\088\00000wrp.W51
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l.

The Hflryj.gv;Ulg-property

The Harrisville residential property owned by Ben prior
to his marriage was converted into commingled marital property
through subsequent transactions.

A portion was sold to Grant Z.

and Annie Stephens on January 26, 1962 (Ex. 57d) for $11,000,
which was deposited in the Maxfield's joint account.

(Tr. 15. )

The Maxfields then jointly mortgaged the remaining Harrisville
residential property to purchase property in Plain City, Utah, in
the amount of $16,900.

Louise signed the mortgage on this

property and was obligated for the repayment of the loan.

(Ex.

8p, 9p, 10p, and 16p. )
Louise also helped improve the Harrisville residential
property during the marriage by painting it.

(Tr. 101, 102. )

When the remaining Harrisville residential property was sold in
three parcels to Eggleston, Edwards, and Nye (Ex. 9p, lOp, 57d),
the three warranty deeds listed the grantors as J.B. Maxfield and
Louise Maxfield, husband and wife, and were signed by both Ben
and Louise.

Again, all proceeds from these sales were placed in

the couple's joint accounts.

(Tr. 15. )

These three sales

occurred over a 5 year period between 1964 and 1969.
In their brief, appellants refer to sales of the
Harrisville property to George L. and Karlene Knight (Ex. 57d)
and to Vernon E. and Bonnie Lee Moss (Ex. 57d) from the
Harrisville residential property brought by Ben to the marriage.

-6-
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These sales, however, both occurred prior to the marriage.

No

evidence was presented at trial to indicate what Ben did with the
proceeds of the sales.

There was no evidence that the proceeds

were either placed into the joint accounts with Louise or brought
into the marriage as Ben' s separate property.
2.

His field Gravel Company.

Ben's interest in Hisfield Gravel Company was also
converted to marital property.

On March 16, 1967, Ben and Louise

executed an agreement for the dissolution of Hisfield Gravel.
(Ex. 15p, 53p. )

By this agreement, Ben and Louise assumed all

obligations, debts, benefits, and rights of Hisfield Gravel
Company under an October 20, 1961, contract between Hisfield
Gravel Company and Security Title Company of Ogden.

Hisfield

Gravel Company in return conveyed to both Ben and Louise 67.3
acres of land in the Rolling Hills subdivision and Lots 15, 16
and 17 of the Rolling Hills Addition.

The warranty deed from

Hisfield Gravel Company conveyed the property to Ben and Louise
as joint tenants with full rights of survivorship.

(Ex. 54p. )

Louise also participated in the dissolution meetings of Hisfield
Gravel.

(Tr. 108. )
Louise and Ben thereafter jointly sold this property.

They sold the three Rolling Hills Addition lots to Dale W. and
Linda Stoker, Huffman and Fiet, and Steve C. and Glenda L. Packer
under warranty deeds that listed both Ben and Louise as the

-7g:\wpl\088\00000wrp.W51
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sellers.

These sales occurred during the period of July 1967 to

November of 1970.

These three sales generated a total of

$11,350, which was deposited in the couple's joint accounts.
(Tr. 15, Ex. 56d. )
Louise and Ben also sold 64.87 acres of the Rolling
Hills subdivision that they had received from Hisfield Gravel to
Fife Equipment and Investment Company ("Fife") on June 1, 1973
for $80, 000.

The purchase agreement with Fife specifically

identified Ben and Louise as owners of the property (Ex. 56d),
and the warranty deed showed both Ben and Louise as grantors.
(Ex. 56d. ) As with the money from the sales of the other
properties, the $80,000 was deposited in Louise and Ben's joint
accounts.

(Tr. 15. )
Hisfield Gravel conveyed a small 40 foot by 53 foot

parcel of property located at 2071 Lane, Ogden, Utah to Ben in
September of 1963.

(Ex. 14p.)

This property was then mortgaged

by both Ben and Louise in the amount of $5,000.

Under the terms

of the mortgage, Louise was obligated to repay the loan.

(Ex.

•••

14p. ) When the Maxfields sold the property to Richard and Ethel
Lou Sobers, the warranty deed identified Ben and Louise as
grantors of the property.

(Ex. 14p. ) The proceeds of the sale

were placed in Ben and Louise's joint accounts.

(Tr. 15. )

i

-8-
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3.

Miscellaneous properties.

In their brief, appellants improperly suggest that the
property identified as Lot 1, Block 1, El Rancho, Ogden City,
(sold to George H. and Donna G. Eastman) provided money that was
deposited in the joint account.

(Appellants' brief, at 11. )

To

the contrary, the property was sold prior to the marriage1 and,
as discussed above, in essence was sold for the amount owing on
the property and provided no funds for Ben and Louise.

(Ex.

23d. )
Finally, between January 1962 and June 1975, Ben and
Louise jointly acquired and resold several parcels of real
estate.

They purchased the property located at 453 Harrisville

Road in 1962 from Hellwell and later resold it to Sevy, earning a
$3,500 profit.

(Ex. 7p and 20d. )

In 1964, Ben and Louise

purchased property in Plain City, Utah, mortgaged it, and then
resold it in four different transactions between April of 1964
and August of 1967.

(Ex. 8p, 2Id. )

at least $9,200 in profit.

These transactions brought

Finally, the Maxfields purchased

property at 458 16th Street from Campkin in 1975 and resold it to
Bice for a $4, 000 profit.

(Tr. 99, 22d. )

The total proceeds

from the sales of these jointly acquired parcels of real estate
amounted to $43,700.

(See Appellant's Brief at 13. )

These

In their brief, appellants state that the sale occurred on
March 1, 1960, which was well before Ben's marriage to Louise in
September, 1961. (Appellants' brief, at 11. )
-9-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

g:\wpl\088\00000wrp.W51

proceeds were deposited in Louise and Ben's joint accounts.

(Tr.

15. )
Louise participated in these transactions and worked to
improve the properties.

(Tr. 25-26, 101. )

It is important to

note that the proceeds from the sales of these properties
apparently were placed in the same joint accounts as all other
real estate transactions.

(Tr. 15. )

The Maxfields also paid for

their living expenses through the funds contained in these joint
accounts.

(Tr. 128, Ex. 25d. ) Appellants concede that these

properties were jointly acquired.

(Appellant's brief, at 12-13. )

Louise took an active role in managing and protecting
the couple's property.

(Tr. 107, 118-19.)

During the early

years of the marriage, both Louise and Ben managed the checkbook.
(Tr.

107. )

In 1970, Ben began to have health problems caused by

his drinking (Tr. 107) and in 1978, Louise took exclusive control
of the couple's checking account because Ben was spending from
three to five hundred dollars a month on alcohol.

(Tr. 118-19.)

Louise played an integral role in managing and protecting the
i

couple's joint finances during this time.
In 1985, Ben and Louise conveyed their interest in the
marital home to Louise and her three children.

(Ex. 45d. ) 2 At

2

In their brief, appellants do not challenge the lower court' s
finding that the home deeded to Louise and her three children was
non-marital property. (Finding of Fact No. 4. )
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the same time, the farm in Harrisville owned by Ben prior to the
marriage was deeded to Ben and his children.

(Tr. 87-88.)

During the 25 year period between 1961 and 1986 the
Maxfields continued to live from the funds placed in their joint
checking and savings accounts.

They also placed certain of these

funds in joint certificates of deposit.

As of November 25, 1986,

the couple's joint accounts were as follows:
Account Number

^Qint Qyn$rg

Amount

Checking Account
121 477 4

J. B. Maxfield or
Louise A. Maxfield

$ 14, 178. 18

Savings Account
0109-8233

J. B. Maxfield or
Louise A. Maxfield

10,372.71

CD 30247

J. B. Maxfield or
Louise A. Maxfield or
Joy Thornock

66,677.21

CD 32104

Louise A. Maxfield or
J. B. Maxfield or
Stanton LeSieur

72,489.02

CD 32911

Louise A. Maxfield or
J. B. Maxfield or
Joy Thornock

9,097.11

CD 34244

J. B. Maxfield or
Louise A. Maxfield or
Ben J. Maxfield

63,215.00

CD 34245

J. B. Maxfield or
Louise A. Maxfield

37,804.37

As appellants acknowledge, there is no evidence that any party
other than J. B. Maxfield and Louise A. Maxfield ever contributed
funds to the said accounts.

(Appellant' s brief at 5. )

-11g:\wpl\088\00000wrp.W51
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During November of 1986, Ben's physical health
deteriorated to the point that Louise was unable to care for him.
Their medical doctor told Louise that Ben would need to be put in
a rest home.

(Tr. 91-93.)

Louise believed Ben was suffering

from a deterioration of the brain.

(Tr. 89. )

When she informed

Ben' s children3 that Ben was to be put into a rest home, the
children physically removed Ben from Louise' s home and took him
home with them.

Ben' s children soon discovered that they also

could not care for him.

(Tr. 93. )

Ben stayed with Joy Thornock

for 10 days and Ben J. Maxfield ("Benny") for two weeks.
then placed into a rest home.

He was

(Tr. 93. )

During this time period, Benny asked Louise about the
status of the couple's finances.

(Tr. 156.)

$11,000.00 from the couple in August of 1986.

Benny had borrowed
(Tr. 166. )

Louise

described her relationship with Ben's children as "very distant"
during this period.

(Tr. 114. )

Louise believed that after Ben's

children removed Ben from the home, they would take all the
marital funds on deposit in the joint accounts, depriving her of
any means of support.

(Tr. 115, 131. )

Louise consulted her attorney who advised her to remove
the money in the joint accounts to prevent Ben's children from
taking the money.

(Tr. 54. )

Louise then removed the funds and

3

These were Ben' s children from his previous marriage, Ben J.
Maxfield and Joy Thornock, who are the appellants in the present
case.
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i

placed a total of $150,000.00 in five P. O. D. accounts, each in
the amount of $30, 000. 00.

The five P. 0. D. designees were Ben' s

children and Louise' s children.

Louise placed the remaining

funds in a joint account with her three children to take care of
Ben and her for the rest of their lives.

(Tr. 53. )

She in fact

used the money from this joint account to provide for herself and
to pay for Ben's rest home care.

(Tr. 131. )

On February 13, 1987, Louise executed a trust agreement
to take care of both herself and Ben.

She transferred the funds

that she had withdrawn in November of 1986 to the trust.
Thereafter, Ben joined his children in a suit for conversion
against Louise based on her withdrawal of the funds in the joint
accounts.

(Tr. 267-70.)

Ben also filed for divorce (Tr. 269)

and prepared a trust under which Louise would receive only
$600.00 a month.

(R. 5; Ex. 43d.)

On May 18, 1987, the Maxfields

entered into a stipulation whereby the conversion suit was
dismissed, a special conservatorship account was established at
the Bank of Utah to care for Ben and Louise to the exclusion of
their children, and the determination of property distribution
issues was relegated to the divorce action.

(Ex. 2p. )

At the trial of the divorce action, the court in that
case found Ben incompetent and refused to grant the divorce.
(Ex. 3p. )

The court in the divorce case also modified the

stipulation and order to allow the special conservator
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arrangement to continue until further order by the court but
specifically declared that the holding of the funds by the
special conservator was not a final determination of the
ownership of said funds.
December 3, 1989.
the following day.

(Ex. 3p/)

Ben Maxfield passed away on

(R. 1. ) Appellants filed this probate action
(R. 4. )
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The appellants have wholly failed to meet their burden
in attacking the trial court' s finding of fact that the bulk of
the property Ben brought into the marriage lost its separate
character and became marital property.

Substantial evidence

presented at trial indicated that Louise augmented, maintained
and protected the property both before and after the property was
sold and the proceeds were placed in joint accounts.

The

evidence further showed that Ben inextricably commingled the

s
property with both Louise' s property and other marital property
during most of their 28 year marriage.

Finally, the evidence

indicated that Ben intended to contribute the bulk of his
property to the marital estate.
Case law dealing with the definition of marital
property in divorce actions should apply to this case in
i

interpreting Utah Code Ann.

§ 75-6-103(1) (1978).

The facts of

this case are closely analagous to those requiring an equitable
division of property in divorce cases.
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In addition, public
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policy considerations favor a construction of Section 75-6-103(1)
based on the equitable rules provided in domestic law.
The definition of marital property contained in the
elective share provisions of Utah' s Uniform Probate Code, Utah
Code Ann. § 75-2-202(a) and (b), is not applicable to the instant
action.

Louise has not elected to pursue her statutory elective

share and, therefore, the narrow definition of marital property
for that limited purpose has little relevance to the present
case.

However, even assuming, arguendo, that the elective share

definition applies, appellants failed to overcome the presumption
of marital property contained in the statute.
75-2-202(2)(b).

Utah Code Ann. §

Accordingly, the trial court's finding of fact

and decision below should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT
LOUISE MAXFIELD OWNED ONE-HALF OF THE
SUMS HELD IN THE JOINT ACCOUNTS.
A.

Scope of Review.
In Finding of Fact No. 2, the trial court found that

"the bulk of the property brought into the marriage by John Ben
Maxfield lost its character as separate property and became
marital property to which each contributed one-half (1/2)."
182. )

Appellants seek to overturn this finding.
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(R.

This Court recently reiterated the standard of review
applicable to an appeal of the trial court' s findings of fact in
Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P. 2d 1176 (Utah 1989),

There, the court

stated:
To successfully attack findings of fact, an
appellant must first marshal all the evidence
supporting the findings and then demonstrate
that, even if viewed in the light most
favorable to the trial court, the evidence is
legally insufficient to support the findings.
And the legal sufficiency of the evidence is
determined under civil procedure rule 52(a),
which provides: "Findings of fact, whether
based on oral or documentary evidence, shall
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous,
and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the
credibility of the witnesses. " A trial
court's factual finding is deemed "clearly
erroneous" only if it is against the clear
weight of the evidence.
Id. at 1178 (citations omitted).
150,

See Jensen v. Brown, 639 P. 2d

152 (Utah 1981) (the same standard applies to equity cases).
In the instant case, appellants have not complied with

this rule.

In their brief, they made no attempt to marshal the

evidence in support of the trial court' s finding nor do they
demonstrate that the evidence supporting the finding is
insufficient even if viewed in the light most favorable to the
trial court.

Appellant' s brief presents the evidence in a light

most favorable to their own position and largely ignores the
contrary evidence.

Accordingly, Judge Roth' s findings should not

be disturbed.

-16-
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B.

Appellants have not jnet their fryrflen in
ghgwjng that the SVms gnfleppgitj-Ti the JglPt
accounts were not contributed equally bv the

partiesUtah Code Ann. § 75-6-103(1) (1978) provides:
A joint account belongs, during the lifetime
of all parties, to the parties in proportion
to the net contributions by each to the sums
on deposit, unless there is clear and
convincing evidence of a different intent.
Appellants assert that the transfer of funds from the
joint accounts by Louise in November of 1986 terminated any joint
tenancy in those funds.

This assertion implicitly admits that

the relative interests of Ben and Louise in the sums then on
deposit in the joint accounts were segregated in November of 1986
according to their "contributions" to the accounts.

The

determination of who owned what portion of the sums withdrawn
from the joint accounts must be made as of the date on which
Louise withdrew the funds.
Under Section 75-6-103(1), Louise was entitled to
ownership of the amounts that she was responsible for
contributing to the joint accounts.

Appellants take the

simplistic view that because Ben brought some property with him
into the marriage from which cash proceeds were generated, his
estate is entitled to all of the money in the accounts except for
the $9,500 earned by Louise during her marriage to Ben and half
of the profits on the jointly-acquired property.

This view is

contrary to Utah law regarding the scope of marital property.
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Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

As

the Utah Court of Appeals recently noted, "Marital property is
ordinarily all property acquired during marriage, and it
' encompasses all of the assets of every nature possessed by the
parties, whenever obtained and from whatever source derived. ' "
Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1317-18 (Utah App. 1990) (quoting
gfrrflper yT ggirflner, 748 P. 2d 1076, 1079 (Utah 1988).
Appellants would have this Court ignore the significant
efforts made by Louise during her 28 year marriage to conserve
the assets she and her husband had accumulated.

They would have

this Court overlook the substantial role that Louise played in
her marriage partnership with her husband.

The Court in Dunn

also specifically indicated that the view now taken by appellants
is incorrect.

The Court stated:

The lower court's approach to marital
property distribution is troublesome as it
suggests a weighing only of each partner' s
financial contribution to the marriage. Such
an analysis ignores contributions of love,
encouragement, and companionship, which elude
monetary valuation. Such an analysis also
gives short shrift to spouses who contribute
homemaking skills and child care.
Id. at 1322.

In the instant case, Ben and Louise conducted their

lives as a partnership in every sense.

They jointly participated

in all matters affecting their assets on deposit.

They pooled

their efforts and their resources together over a period of
nearly 28 years.

It was from the joint accounts that they drew

the money on which they lived during that long period of time.

-18-
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Therefore, according to the rationale of Dunn, all of the
proceeds in the joint accounts had become marital property.
Having considered all of the evidence, the lower court
found itself unable to determine who had contributed what
specific amounts to the joint accounts.

At the conclusion of the

trial, the lower court made the following oral findings from the
bench:
During some 27 years of marriage prior to the
separation, these parties bought and sold
property, and they made investments. It is
my opinion based on the evidence that the
bulk of the property that J. B. Maxfield had
lost its character as separate property and
became marital property through these
transactions.
This is not a simple case of a person
owning property prior to a marriage, keeping
that in his own name, and exchanging that for
something else. This is a case where there
were numerous transactions. Property was
placed in joint tenancy. It was turned over
several times. And I find that the bulk of
the property lost its character as separate
property.
Therefore, as it applies to the
accounts, I find that each contributed one
half. Finding anything different would have
to be simple speculation on my part as to
what percentage each contributed at that
point.
(Tr.

236. )
The trial court' s finding must be upheld unless

appellants can show that it is against the clear weight of
evidence.

As noted above, appellants have not marshaled all of

-19-
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the evidence in support of the court's finding.

They did not

summarize the "numerous transactions" referred to by the court.
They made no effort to describe all of the evidence of the
couple' s investments, of the various sales transactions in which
they were involved.

Without having that evidence summarized

before it, this Court cannot overturn the lower court' s finding
of fact that Louise and Ben each contributed one-half of the sums
into the joint accounts.
The finding of the lower court that the property Ben
brought with him into the marriage "lost its character as
separate property and became marital property to which each
contributed one-half" (Finding of Fact No. 2) is consistent with
the manner in which Utah courts divide property owned by a
husband and wife in divorce cases.

Divorce cases provide the

best analogy to the facts of the present case since both Ben and
i

Louise were living in November of 1986, when Louise withdrew the
money from the joint accounts.

The Utah cases dealing with the

division of marital property in divorce cases provide helpful
guidance in determining how to apportion ownership of a joint
account under Section 75-6-103(1) as between a husband and wife.
In contesting the trial court's finding of fact,
appellants assert that the property brought by Ben into the
marriage did not lose its character as separate property by being
placed into joint tenancy through various sales and purchases.
i

-20-
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(Appellants' brief, at 21.) Although "premarital property,
gifts, and inheritances may be viewed as separate property, and
in appropriate circumstances, equity will require that each party
retain the separate property brought to the marriage," Burke v.
Burke, 753 P. 2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987), there are exceptions, as
the Court of Appeals noted in Burt v. Burt. 799 P. 2d 1166 (Utah
App. 1990):
[S]uch property may appropriately be
considered part of the marital estate,
subject to division, when the other spouse
has by his or her efforts augmented,
maintained, or protected the inherited or
donated property . . . where the parties have
inextricably commingled the property with
marital property so that it has lost its
separate character, . . . or where the
recipient spouse has contributed all or part
of the property to the marital estate.
I£. at 1169 (citations omitted).

See Mortenson v. Mortenson, 760

P. 2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988).
In the present case each of these exceptions is
satisfied.

First, Louise augmented, maintained or protected

virtually all of the separate property brought into the marriage
by Ben as well as the funds in the joint accounts.
and improved the Harrisville residential properties.
102. )

She painted
(Tr. 101-

She attended and participated in the dissolution meetings

of His field Gravel Company and entered into an agreement
accepting certain obligations and responsibilities concerning the
dissolution.

(Tr. 108, Ex. 15p. ) She signed the mortgage
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document on the small parcel of property deeded solely to Ben by
His field Gravel Company as well as the mortgage document on the
Harrisville residential properties.

(Ex. 8p, 9p, lOp, 16p, 14p.)

Appellants completely ignore the significance of
Louise's signing mortgages in connection with these properties.
The fact that she placed her good name and credit at risk along
with her husband is strong evidence that Louise and Ben were
acting together for their mutual interests and that the proceeds
from the sales of the properties had, in their minds, lost their
character as separate property.
She helped manage the couple' s books from the outset of
the marriage and took sole control of the joint checking account
in 1978 to protect their assets during the time that Ben was
suffering from a drinking problem.

(Tr. 107, 118-19. )

She added

her own earnings to the joint accounts from 1961 to 1971, the
time period when most of the real estate transactions transpired.
(Tr.

16. )

She participated in the purchases and sales of the

jointly acquired properties and the proceeds from those
transactions were placed into the joint accounts.
101. )

(Tr. 15, 26,

She signed warranty deeds to the purchasers of the

property.

(Ex. 7p, 8p, 9p, lOp, 12p, 14p, 15p, 16p, 19d, 20d,
(

21d, 22d, 56d, 57d).
The weight of the evidence supports the lower court's
finding that the bulk of the property brought into the marriage

-22-
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by Ben lost its character as separate property and became marital
property.

There is ample evidence that Louise helped to augment,

maintain, or protect both the joint accounts and the real
property parcels prior to their sale.
Second, the property Ben brought to the marriage was
thereafter inextricably commingled with the marital property and
lost its separate character.

As noted above, Louise' s paychecks,

Ben's paychecks, the proceeds from the sales of the jointly
acquired property, the proceeds from the His field Gravel
property, and the proceeds from the Harrisville residential
properties were all placed in the same joint accounts.

The

couple's living expenses were also paid out of these accounts.
The real estate was acquired and sold in numerous transactions
over a long time period.

Indeed, not only were these properties

inextricably commingled, they were inextricably commingled during
most of their 28 year marriage.
It should be emphasized that the Hisfield Gravel
property was deeded to both Ben and Louise.

(Ex. 54p. )

This

court has held that a party attacking the validity of a written
instrument such as a deed must do so by clear and convincing
evidence.

Baker v. Pattee, 684 P. 2d 632, 634, (Utah 1984);

Barlow Soc. v. Commercial Sec. Bank, 723 P. 2d 398, 400 (Utah
1986).

No evidence whatsoever was presented at trial that

indicated Hisfield Gravel did not intend to convey the real
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estate to both Ben and Louise, and appellants did not argue the
issue.

The proceeds from the sales of that property clearly

constituted marital property when such funds were placed into the
joint accounts.
Finally, Ben appears to have contributed the property
at issue to the marital estate.

The farm property, however, was

treated differently, having been deeded specifically to Ben and
his children.

The couple treated Louise' s home in the same

fashion, which was deeded to her and her three children from her
prior marriage.

The trial court was impressed with this

evidence:
I find it significant that the farm was
treated separately, and that Louise
Maxfield's home was treated separately. That
leads me to believe that it was the intention
of the parties that that property remain
separate and that the other property be joint
comingled [sic] marital property.
(Tr.

236-37. )
Appellants have pointed to no contrary evidence of the

parties' intent.

Their whole case consists of a mere recitation

of evidence that Ben owned some property prior to his marriage
which he sold after his marriage.

Appellants again overlook the

fact that the proceeds from the sales of all of the properties
were placed into joint accounts where they were available for use
by the Maxfields.

They ignore the fact that those proceeds were

thereafter used for the mutual support of both Ben and Louise.

-24-
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They presented no evidence at trial that prior to November of
1986 Ben ever intended that any of the funds should not become
part of the marital estate or that they not be owned mutually by
he and his wife.
In light of the many years that the funds were kept in
joint tenancy, used for the joint support of Ben and Louise, and
commingled with marital funds, an obvious inference is raised
that Ben contributed the property to the marital estate.

There

was ample evidence to support the court' s finding that the bulk
of Ben' s property lost its character as separate property and
became marital property.

As the trial court found, the separate

treatment of Ben' s farm and Louise' s home is significant.
Everything else was intended to be owned in common, without
treating it as separate property.
In short, because the amounts in the joint accounts
became marital property and part of the marital estate, equitable
considerations dictate that they were "contributed" equally by
Ben and Louise within the meaning of Utah Code Ann.
§ 75-6-103(1).

The substantial weight of the evidence presented

at trial supported the trial court' s conclusion that the property
brought by Ben to the marriage lost its separate character and
was subject to an equitable division by the court according to
the criteria expressed in Burt.

-25g:\wpl\088\00000wrp.W51
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

This case could have a substantial impact on divorce
cases, where money on deposit in joint accounts frequently must
be divided.

Courts generally divide such funds based on

principles of equity and fairness -to the parties.

If this Court

holds, as appellants would have it hold, that Section 75-6-103(1)
requires an exacting calculation as to who deposited what
specific amounts in joint accounts without regard to the factors
discussed in Burt and other cases, it will tie the hands of
divorce courts and will leave many spouses without an equitable
share of such funds.
Many domestic cases involve long-term marriages where
money was pooled and used for the common support of a husband and
wife over many years.

Not unusually in those cases, one spouse

generates the income while the other spouse lends support at
home.

Courts have not hesitated in such cases to award the

spouse providing support at home a fair share of marital
property, without regard to the specific source of the income.
See Dunn v. Dunn. 802 P.2d 1314, 1322 (Utah App. 1990).

If
{

appellants prevail in this case, courts sitting in divorce cases
throughout the State of Utah will be constrained to apply Section
75-6-103(1) in a way that may treat some spouses unfairly.
Other public policy considerations also favor the
application of divorce law to the instant action.

(

No valid

reason exists to define marital property differently where a
•
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marriage ends as a result of death rather than divorce (unless,
unlike the present case, the elective share is at issue).

Ben's

children should not be entitled to a larger share of the marital
estate merely because Ben became incapacitated prior to the
divorce hearing and died.

His children' s interest in the marital

property certainly is no greater than Ben' s interest would have
been if the divorce had been completed.

A spouse' s interest in

marital property should not depend on the avenue the other spouse
takes in leaving the marriage.
The reasonable approach is the one taken by Judge Roth
in the present case.

He considered more than the fact that Ben

may have owned certain property before his marriage.

His finding

that that property lost its character as separate property was
founded on substantial evidence and is consistent with how
divorce courts throughout the State apply equitable principles in
dividing assets.
C.

The lower court' s Order should be affirmed.

The Elective Share Statute Does Not Apply.
Appellants assert that the definition of marital

property for the purpose of computing the elective share in Utah
Code Ann. § 75-2-202(2)(a) applies to this action.
reliance on that section is mistaken.

Their

That statute expressly

applies only for the limited purpose of determining the augmented
estate to calculate the elective share.

Louise simply has not

made any claim against Ben' s estate based on her elective share.
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Appellants erroneously imply that Louise's objection to
the informal probate of Ben' s will contained an election to, claim
her elective share.

(Appellants' brief at 23).

The objection

merely requested that a "determination be made of marital',
property and/or other properties which would be subject to'the
statutory spouse allowances and marital shares."

(R. 41).

Louise made this request to enable her to determine the extent of
Ben' s estate and allow her to make a knowledgeable choice
regarding her options.

The request cannot be construed as an

election to take her elective share.

Therefore, the elective

share provisions, including the definition of marital property,
are not relevant to the issues before the court.
Moreover, the determination of marital property under
the Uniform Probate Code applies where a person has died.
Although Ben Maxfield has admittedly died, the issue in the
present case focuses not on his assets at the time of his death,
but on how much of the money in the joint accounts he owned in
November, 1986, when Louise withdrew the money from those
accounts.

Both Ben and Louise were living at the time.

.

The more

reasonable approach favors the principles used in domestic cases,
which guide Utah Courts when they are called upon to divide
property and assets, including money on deposit in joint
accounts, owned by living spouses.
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Finally, the elective share statute provides that all
values included in the augmented estate are presumed to be
marital property.

Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-202(2)(b).

The

appellants failed to overcome this presumption in the proceedings
below because, as the trial court found, Louise and Ben
extensively commingled their assets throughout most of thier 28
year marriage.
finding of fact.

There was substantial evidence to support this
Therefore, even assuming, arguendo, that the

definition of marital property for purposes of computing the
elective share as contained in Section 75-2-202(2)(a) were to
apply to this case, the statutory presumption of marital property
contained in Section 75-2-202(2)(b) fully supports Judge Roth's
ruling.
II.
APPELLANTS DO NOT CONTEST THE COURT'S RULING
AWARDING CERTAIN PROPERTY TO LOUISE MAXFIELD.
In addition to the money withdrawn from the joint
accounts, the lower court awarded certain other property to
Louise.

Specifically, the court held that Louise was entitled to

half of the acreage added to the farm property after the marriage
and to her residence acquired prior to the marriage.

(R. 185. )

Appellants have not attacked this portion of the Court' s order,
which should be affirmed.
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III.
APPELLEE HAS MOVED FOR THE DISMISSAL OF HER
CROSS-APPEAL.
Louise A. Maxfield has moved this Court for an order
dismissing her cross-appeal, pursuant to Rule 37(b), Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure.

Accordingly, she will not brief the

issues set forth in her docketing statement and does not intend
to pursue her cross-appeal. 4
CONCLUSION
Under Utah Code Ann. § 75-6-103(1), the trial court was
required to make a determination who had contributed what amount
as between Louise and Ben Maxfield.

Judge Roth found that each

had contributed one-half, even though Ben had brought some
property into the marriage.

The lower court' s finding that the

bulk of Ben' s property had lost its character as separate
property was well-supported by the evidence.

Appellants failed

to marshal the evidence in support of the finding and to show

4

Louise A. Maxfield' s present counsel did not participate in
the trial of this case and were thus not completely familiar with
the facts and issues involved at the time of the filing of the
Notice of Cross-appeal.
Having since become fully advised
regarding the facts and the legal questions involved, counsel have
been able to consult with Louise A. Maxfield regarding the matter.
She has accordingly determined not to pursue her cross-appeal and
has moved for its dismissal.
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that it was against the clear weight of the evidence.

Having

failed in that burden, the lower court' s order must be affirmed.
DATED this -3>

day of May, 1991.
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